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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS

FED ERA TED CAPITAL
CORPORATION, dba FEDERATED
CAPITAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20140569-CA

vs.
REBECCA NAZAR, individually and dba
LITTLE GIFT SHOP,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
ARGUMENT

I.

A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE MAY NOT BE FIRST RAISED
IN A RESPONSIVE PLEADING

Nazar's apparent assertion that all defenses may be raised by "answer, motion or
demand" is contrary to Rule 8( c) that specifically requires a statute of limitations defense
to be raised "in a responsive pleading." Aplee. Br. at 18, citing Royal Res., Inc. v.

Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). Not all affirmative defenses may
be raised by motion.
Defenses that may be raised by motion are found in Rule 12(b). Rule l 2(b)
provides in pertinent part:
(;w

Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: ( 1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted.
U .R.C.P. l 2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, before a responsive pleading is filed, certain
defenses set forth in Rule 12(b)(l) - (7) may be made by motion.
Rule 8( c) provides in pertinent part:
A party must set forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading accord
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
comparative fault, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure
of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense.
U.R.C.P. 8(c) (emphasis added). Thus, along with other enumerated defenses, a statute
of limitations defense "must" be raised "in a responsive pleading."
Rule l 2(h) provides, "A party waives all defenses . . . not presented either by
motion or by answer or reply .... " U.R.C.P. 12(h). In other words, some defenses may be
raised by motion or by answer or reply. This does not void Rule 8(c)'s requirement that
enumerated affinnative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense, must be
raised "in a responsive pleading," meaning an answer or reply.
The cases cited by Nazar do not void the requirements found in Rules 8(c) and 9(i)
that a statute of limitations defense must be specifically raised in the pleading ("referring
to or describing the statute by section number, subsection designation, if any, or

2
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designating the provision relied on sufficiently to identify it") or it is waived.
~

See

U.R.C.P. 9(i).
In Royal Resources, the Court stated in relevant part, "The defense of election of
remedies is an affirmative one and must be raised by way of answer, motion, or
demand .... " See Royal Res., Inc., 603 P.2d at 796 (citing U.R.C.P. 8(b) and (c); U.R.C.P.
12(a), (b), and (c); and Costello v. Kasteler, 324 P.2d 772 (1958)). Rules 8(b) and (c)
require certain affirmative defenses be raised in a pleading or they are waived; Rules
12(a), (b), and (c) provide the relevant requirements of presenting a defense in a motion

'@

before a responsive pleading is filed; and Costello provides that an election of remedies
defense may be brought by way of demand. Because election of remedies is not listed as
a defense that must be raised in a pleading, or may be raised by motion, Royal Resources
cannot properly be construed to mean that a statute of limitations defense may be raised
by motion. As shown above, Rule 8(c) and 9(i) are to the contrary.

<@

Likewise, Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, 109 P.3d 393, which
merely quotes the same language previously set forth in Royal Resources, does not void
the requirements set forth in Rules 8(c) and 9(i) that a statute of limitations defense must
be specifically pleaded. See Yazd, 2005 UT App 82, at ,I 7, n. 2.
Moreover, the election of remedies doctrine is different in nature from a statute of
limitations defense. A specific statute of limitations defense is potentially dispositive of a
claim, and it is waived if not raised by pleading. On the other hand, an election of
remedies is not dispositive in nature, but rather is used to compel a party to choose

3
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between various possible remedies, and it can be asserted by pleading, motion, or
demand. See Royal Res., Inc., 603 P.2d at 796.

ev

GDE Construction Inc. v. Leavitt, 2012 UT App 298, 294 P.3d 567, helps clarify
that some defenses may be raised by motion and some by pleading. This Court observed,
"Normally, a party waives all defenses not raised in a responsive pleading, such as an
answer or reply." Id. at

,r

13 (citation omitted). This Court recognized that "[s]ubject to

exceptions inapplicable here, defenses not properly pleaded are waived." Id. This Court
then cited Rule 12(h), which provides that certain defenses can be brought by motion. Id.
Thus, the apparent exception to the rule that defenses not properly pleaded are waived,
are those defenses brought by motion under Rule 12(b).
Nazar also confuses the definition of "pleading" and "motion" as she asserts on
pages 20 and 28 of her brief that she raised the specific statute of limitations defense for
the first time in her "summary judgment pleadings" filed with the court. Aplee. Br. at 20,
28 (emphasis added). But a "pleading" and a "motion" are not the same. Rule 7(a) sets
forth the definition of what constitutes "pleadings," and a motion for summary judgment
is not a pleading. The relevant "pleading" in this case is Nazar's Answer, which was filed
in the district court on April 15, 2013. (R. 34-37). Nazar did not raise the specific statute
of limitations defense in her Answer, in violation of Rules 8(c) and 9(i).
The cases cited by Nazar should be read in light of the plain language of Rules
8(c), 9(i), 12(b) and (c), as well as case law clearly holding that a statute of limitations
defense must be pleaded with specificity or it is waived. See, e.g., Wasatch Mines Co. v.

Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007, 1011, fn. 5 (Utah 1970). These Rules and the cases cited by
4
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~

Federated establish that under Utah law, the statute of limitations must be specifically
ivJ

pleaded or such defense is waived.
That Nazar could not raise this defense for the first time in her motion for

~

summary judgment should have been obvious to the district court, and it was plain error
to grant Nazar's motion for summary judgment.
II.

CHENEY v. RUCKER DOES NOT SUPPORT NAZAR'S ARGUMENT

Nazar relies on Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), to assert that "the
plain mandate of justice" allows the statute of limitations defense to be specifically raised
for the first time in a motion for summary judgment. Aplee. Br. at 18-20. But Cheney
actually supports the well-settled law that the procedural statute of limitations defense
must be raised by pleading. Nazar ignores the distinction between a statute of limitations
affirmative defense (procedural), with a factual affirmative defense such as a subsequent
agreement (substantive).
~

In Cheney v. Rucker, the parties entered into a commission agreement. 381 P .2d at
88. Two days later, the parties entered into another contract detailing the manner of
payment. Id. Two weeks later, the parties entered into a third agreement relating to the

~

commissions, which superseded and replaced the prior contracts. Id. at 88-89. The
account was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff, who brought suit to recover the
commissions, but the plaintiff did not limit his claim to the agreed-upon amount in the
third agreement, but rather asked for the commission price from the first agreement. Id. at
89.

5
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Defendant failed to raise the third agreement in his responsive pleading as an
affirmative defense, but instead offered the third agreement as evidence at trial. Cheney,

~-

381 P.2d at 91. Plaintiff objected under Rule 8(c) because defendant failed to raise the
issue as an affirmative defense. Id. The trial court received the third agreement over
plaintiffs objection, and entered its ruling based on the third agreement. Id. at 88.
On appeal, plaintiff again asserted that Rule 8( c) should have prevented the third
agreement from being admitted as evidence because defendant did not plead the
subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense. Id. at 91. The Utah Supreme Court noted
that Rule 8(c) "requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded", but the Court noted this
rule was a "procedural point" and is "not the only rule in the book of Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id. The Court observed that the rules "must all be looked to in the light of
their even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the
end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Id. The Court continued, "Our rules
provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon
the controversy ...." Id. The Court found that under "the plain mandate of justice", the
trial court was required to admit evidence of the third and controlling agreement. Id.
Thus, the Court in Cheney correctly refused to allow the substantive factual issue
of the existence of a binding third agreement to be trumped by the procedural point that
Rule 8(c) requires affirmative defenses to be raised by pleading. Id. at 91.
The procedural issues in this case are different from the substantive factual issues
presented in Cheney. Nazar herself acknowledged below that "[s]tatutes of limitations are
6
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(t...

procedural laws." (R. 65, citing Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 (Utah App. 1994)).
Here, Nazar raised for the first time in her motion for summary judgment the procedural
issue that Federated' s claims should be dismissed because it was not brought within the
four-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations. (R. 65). Thus, Nazar moved for summary
judgment to dismiss Federated's factual claims on the procedural issue that Federated
missed a prescribed procedural filing deadline.
Now that Federated has argued that Nazar herself missed the prescribed
procedural filing deadline to raise her specific statute of limitations defense, Nazar uses
~

Cheney to assert that the "plain mandate of justice" allows her to raise a procedural issue
for the first time in a motion for summary judgment, or else she would not be "afforded
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions [she has] pertaining to [the]

V,

dispute." Aplee. Br. at 18-19, quoting Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91.
But the court in Cheney allowed a substantive factual affirmative defense to be
~

admitted over the procedural requirement of Rule 8(c). Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91. Unlike

Cheney, the issue before this Court is a procedural affirmative defense, not a substantive
factual affirmative defense. It is Federated that has been denied the opportunity to present
its "legitimate contentions" and the "examination into" the factual issues to the court,
because the trial court allowed Nazar to untimely raise the procedural statute of
limitations defense for the first time in her motion for summary judgment. Thus, Cheney
does not support Nazar's assertion that she will be denied the opportunity to raise
legitimate issues if this Court overturns the district court. Nor does Cheney support

7
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Nazar's assertion that she can assert the procedural statute of limitations defense for the
first time in a motion for summary judgment.

III.

FEDERATED DID NOT INVITE THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERROR

Nazar misapplies Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 41, 164 P.3d 366, when asserting
that Federated "affirmatively" invited the error by not objecting to an issue that was not
raised in the trial court. Aplee. Br. at 21-22. A party does not "invite error" by merely
failing to object to an issue raised by the other side. Rather, "invited error generally
occurs in a more affirmative manner, such as where counsel stipulates to the court's
instruction, states directly that there is no objection to a specific ruling of the court, or
provides the court with erroneous authority upon which the court relies." Pratt, 2007 UT
App 41 at 123.
In this case, Federated did not take any affirmative steps to mislead the trial court
into error. There was no direct stipulation to the specific statute of limitations defense
being raised for the first time in the motion for summary judgment, no statement that it
had no objection to a specific ruling of the court, and no authority provided that could
have mislead the court. Thus, Federated did not invite the district court's error and plain
error review is applicable.
IV.

THE CASES RELIED UPON BY FEDERATED ESTABLISH THE COURT
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR

Federated cited Pepperwood Homeowners Ass 'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137,
351 P.3d 844, for the principle that Nazar was required to establish on summary
judgment that she properly raised the specific statute of limitations defense in her

8
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~

Answer, and that "the rules of civil procedure allow entry of summary judgment against a
~

defaulted party only if appropriate." Aplt. Br. at 14-15 (citing Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137
at

,r 6).

The district court is in fact tasked with the burden to "determine whether the

moving party's pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to
judgment as a matter oflaw." Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137 at ,r 6 (emphasis added).
Instead of distinguishing these points, Nazar asserts she "presented every fact in
her pleadings, discovery and declarations necessary to show" that Federated' s claim was
not filed within four years. Aplee. Br. at 23-24. The issue though, is not whether
(@

Federated filed its Complaint within a four-year deadline. The issue is whether Nazar was
entitled to summary judgment, and she could only be entitled to summary judgment if she
properly asserted the specific statute of limitations defense in her Answer. This she did
not do.
Nazar also cites In re Estate of LeFevre, 2009 UT App 286, 220 P.3d 476, in her

(j

Summary of Argument, asserting that this Court "already faced the exact issue now
argued by Federated." Aplee. Br. at 14. This is not accurate. First, Nazar failed to
adequately brief this argument, since it is only set forth in her Summary of Argument and
not in the body of her "Argument," as required by Rule 24(a)(8)-(9) and (b). Next, the
facts and procedural history in LeFevre are different, as the appellant's motion for
summary judgment, which raised a statute of limitations affirmative defense for the first
time, was denied by the trial court. LeFevre, 2009 UT App 286, ,r,r 12, 29. Thus, the trial
court in LeFevre never found that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a

9
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matter of law. Moreover, neither party in LeFevre asserted on appeal that the trial court
committed plain error in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
In this case, the trial court ruled that Nazar was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. Federated asserts that the trial court committed plain error in granting
Nazar's motion for summary judgment since Nazar could only be entitled to summary
judgment on the statute of limitations defense if it was properly raised in her pleadings as
required by Rule 8(c) and 9(i). And because neither party in LeFevre raised the doctrine
of plain error, LeFevre does not control, and this issue can be reviewed for plain error. 1
Nazar also attempts to distinguish Wasatch Mines Co. by asserting it does not
apply because Nazar "set forth in detail in her summary judgment [motion]2 the grounds
for dismissal based on the Pennsylvania four year statute of limitations." Aplee. Br. at 28.
Nazar then relies on the sole dissenting opinion, which cites Rule 1 that pleadings "shall
be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action," and Rule 8(£) that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice." Id. at 27-28 (citing Wasatch Mines Co., 465 P.2d at 1012).

1

Other jurisdictions have recognized a difference between waiver of an issue and
forfeiture of an issue for appellate review. "[W]aiver precludes review whereas forfeiture
permits us to correct an error under a plain error standard. Forfeiture occurs by accident,
neglect or inadvertent failure to timely assert a right. Waiver occurs when a defendant or
his attorney manifests an intention, or expressly declines, to assert a right." United States
v. Doyle, 693 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). In this case,
Federated neither manifested its intention nor expressly declined to assert Rules 8(c) and
9(i). At most, Federated inadvertently failed to assert this issue below.
2
Nazar erroneously labelled her motion for summary judgment as a "summary judgment
pleading". Aplee. Br. at 28.
10
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~

Nazar, however, is not seeking "substantial justice." Nazar is seeking her version
of procedural justice. As set forth above, a statute of limitations defense is a procedural
defense, not a substantive defense. It does not go to the merits of a claim. The merits or
substance of the claim is whether Nazar paid her debts.
Moreover, Wasatch Mines Co. is directly on point. There, the defendant untimely
raised the specific statute of limitations defense for the first time at trial. See Wasatch

Mines Co., 465 P.2d at 1012. Despite the fact that the statute of limitations was only
raised generally in the pleadings, the trial court held that the claims were barred by the
statute of limitations. Id. at I 008. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, finding that
defendant's "general plea of the statute of limitations was not in accordance with Rule
9(h) .... " 3 Id. at 1010-11.
Nazar was not entitled to summary judgment because she failed to plead the
statute of limitations defense with specificity, and the district court committed plain error
~

by granting the motion for summary judgment.
V.

FED ERA TED PRESERVED THE CHOICE OF LAW ARGUMENT
BELOW AND DOES NOT REQUEST TO OVERTURN 100 YEARS OF
PRECEDENT
Nazar's opposition as to "Issue No. Two" is perhaps most notable for what it

ignores:
1. Her failure to preserve argument ignores the record evidence, including her
specific admission that Federated preserved the same issue it now raises on appeal.

3

The current rule is now found at Rule 9(i).
11
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2. Her argument that Federated seeks to "overturn 100 years of precedent" ignores
the settled law in the introductory phrases of Section 188 of the Restatement of Conflicts,

~

the statement of the "place of performance" rule in Pingree, and the Borrowing Statute.
3. And finally, her opposition completely ignores, let alone addresses, the wellsettled rule at the heart of this appeal expressed in Federated's opening brief that: "A suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action."

A.

Nazar acknowledged below that this issue was preserved for appeal.

In her opposition, Nazar repeatedly asserts 4 that Federated failed to preserve and
"never once" argued and "failed to even mention . . . in any fashion" below that the

<is.,·

Borrowing Statute does not apply because the parties' choice of law agreement means its
breach of contract claim arose in Utah. Aplee. Br. at 29-31.
To preserve an issue 5 for appeal, a party must ( 1) specifically raise it, (2) in a
timely fashion, (3) with supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. State v. Gailey,
2015 UT App 2491} 5, 360 P.3d 805 (citing Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,I 15, 164 P.3d

~

366).
Federated specifically raised this issue in its timely-filed opposition memorandum
to Nazar's motion for summary judgment with supporting evidence and relevant legal

4

Nazar made such assertions no less than ten times. Aplee. Br. at 10-12, 14-17, 29-31.
While Utah appellate courts use the words "issue," "claim," "argument," and "matter"
almost interchangeably when discussing the preservation rule (Patterson v. Patterson,
2011 UT 68, ,I 14, 266 P.3d 828), the Utah Supreme Court has taught, "Issues must be
preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised below."
Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63 ,I 45, 323 P .3d 998 (emphasis in original). "An issue is
preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the
court has an opportunity to rule on [it]." Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 1}12.
5

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

~

authority. Indeed, Nazar acknowledged below what she now denies (.ii)

that Federated

made the same argument below that it makes here. See State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, ,r 9, 345
P.3d 1141 (failure to preserve argument is without merit where appellant's "argument on
appeal is the same argument he made to the trial court"). Thus, Nazar's current argument
that Federated did not preserve the issue it raised on appeal is without merit.
1. In her reply memorandum below, Nazar acknowledged Federated raised

the same issue it is arguing on appeal. Contrary to her repeated arguments here, Nazar

acknowledged that Federated asserted in opposition to her motion for summary judgment
~

that the Borrowing Statute did not apply because the parties' contract "states otherwise"
under Pingree, and that the "cause of action for non-payment must have arose [sic] in
Utah." Nazar Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment ("Nazar Reply
Memorandum") at R. 213. In other words, Nazar acknowledged below that she
understood Federated's argument to be what it is arguing now. Cf id. with Federated's

\@

Opening Brief ("Opening Br.") at 8-14.
2. A review of the record establishes that Federated preserved the issue it has
raised on appeal. In its timely-filed Opposition memorandum below (R. 168-186):
a. Federated quoted the choice of law and forum selection provisions which appear in the same paragraph of the parties' Agreement. In its opposition to

Nazar's motion for summary judgment below, Federated quoted the "CONTROLLING
LAW AND JURISDICTION" provision of the parties' Agreement:
This agreement shall be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah ... regardless of where you reside
or where the business is located. . . . YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL
13
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JURISDICTION IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UT AH AND
AGREE THAT ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST
BE BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF
WHO FILES THE SUITS ....

~

Advanta Business Card Agreement ,r 31 (all-caps in the original; italic emphasis added),
R. 174 (quoting R. 191); cf Nazar Reply Memorandum at 214.
b. Federated specifically argued that "The Forum-Selection Clause of the
Agreement Governs in This Case." R. 175. As noted above, the Forum-Selection
Clause contains the parties' choice of law agreement, namely: that their Agreement "shall

be governed solely by ... the laws of the State of Utah." Advanta Business Card
Agreement

,r

31 (emphasis added), R. 174 (quoting R. 191); cf Nazar Reply

Memorandum at R. 214.
c. Federated specifically referred to the parties' choice of law provision:
"[T]he parties agreed that Utah substantive law applied to govern the Agreement."
R. 179 (emphasis added).
d. Federated quoted the Borrowing Statute in full. R. 177, n.1:

A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not
actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be
pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state
who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
Utah Code§ 78B-2-103 (emphasis added).
e. Federated argued that, "In this case, the Borrowing Statute does not apply"
and that "the Borrowing Statute should not be construed to displace the parties'
contractual rights." R. 177, 180. Given the facts here (that the exception after "unless"
does not apply), the only way the Borrowing Statute would not apply is if Federated's
14
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~.

breach of contract claim did not "arise[] in another jurisdiction" but "arose" in Utah. See
Vil

R. 476

,r,r 1, 3, 6, 7; R. 476 ,r

1. Thus, Federated argued below that its breach of contract

claim arose in Utah. As noted above, Nazar acknowledged as much. Nazar Reply
Memorandum at R. 213 (Federated argued that its "cause of action for non-payment must
have arose [sic] in Utah").

f. Quoting this Court's opinion in the Pingree case, Federated argued: "The
court stated that '[ujnless the contract states otherwise, a cause of action for a breach
of contract generally arises where the contract is to be performed." ... (emphasis
\iii

added) ... As discussed above, by its plain language, the Borrowing Statute does not
apply if the parties agree to a particular forum and the procedural law . ... In this
case, the Agreement states otherwise." R. 181 (italics in original), quoting Financial
Bancorp v. Pingree and Dahle, 880 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah App. 1994). Thus, Federated
argued below that because the parties' Agreement "stated otherwise," its breach of

~

contract claim arose in Utah. Cf Nazar Reply Memorandum at R. 213.
Because Federated specifically raised the issue of whether the Borrowing Statute
applied, it preserved the legal issue of whether, as a threshold matter, its breach of
contract claim arose in Utah. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68

,r

20, 266 P.3d 828

("whether and how [a statute] applies ... can be resolved purely as a matter of law").

g. Federated concluded, "The parties agreed to be bound by Utah substantive
law and by Utah's procedural law." R. 185. In other words, Federated argued that
~

because the parties agreed to be bound by Utah's substantive law (via their choice of law
agreement), the case "arose" in Utah under Utah law, not Pennsylvania law so that the
15
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Borrowing Statute did not apply; and that because the parties agreed to be bound by
Utah's procedural law (via their forum selection agreement), Utah's six-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract applied. Id.
In sum, Federated specifically and timely argued that the "Controlling Law and
Jurisdiction" paragraph of the parties' Agreement meant Federated's breach of contract
claim "arose" in Utah and under Utah law (not in Pennsylvania), so that the Borrowing
Statute did not apply. Federated supported its argument by quoting the paragraph from
the parties' Agreement containing both the choice of law and forum selection provisions,
and by quoting this Court's opinion in Pingree for the proposition that because their
contract "stated otherwise," their case "arose" in Utah, not in Pennsylvania. Finally,
Federated quoted the Borrowing Statute and argued that it does not apply here. R. 177184. It therefore supported the issue it raised with supporting evidence and relevant legal
authority. Gailey, 2015 UT App 24915, citing Pratt, 2007 UT 41, 115.
Accordingly, Nazar's argument that Federated failed to preserve this issue for
appeal is without merit.

4. Contrary to Nazar's argument, the Libby opinion itself establishes that
Federated did not raise in Libby the issue it raises here. In further support of her
"failure to preserve" argument, Nazar argues that Federated's opposition memorandum
below was "virtually identical" to its briefs in Libby and Chapa, purportedly showing
"that it never intended to raise additional arguments in this appeal that it did not make in
Libby and Chapa." Aplee. Br. at 29.

16
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Besides ignoring her own admission, corroborated by the record evidence, Nazar's
argument here ignores the key distinction between Libby and this case:
• In Libby, Federated conceded at oral argument that its cause of action in that
case "arose in Pennsylvania. " 6
• Here, Federated has argued consistently that its case against Nazar "arose" in
Utah and that the Borrowing Statute does not apply. 7
As noted, Nazar conceded below that this was the substance of Federated's
argument. The fact that she may disagree with this argument is insufficient support for
Nazar's assertion that Federated failed to preserve this issue.
In sum, because Federated specifically raised with supporting evidence and legal
authority the same issue below it has raised on appeal, because Nazar acknowledged as
much in her reply memorandum below, and because Federated's concession in Libby that
its cause of action "arose in Pennsylvania" distinguishes Libby from this case, Nazar's
"failure to preserve" argument is without merit.

B.

Because Federated preserved the issue it appeals, neither plain error
nor invited error applies here.

Nazar argues that, although Federated may argue plain error here, it does not
apply. Aplle. Br. at 15-16. Because, as shown above, Federated preserved the issue it
appeals, Federated agrees that plain error does not apply.
Nazar further argues that invited error should preclude review. Id. Because Nazar
fails to identify where Federated "intentionally misle[ d] the trial court so as to preserve a
6
7

Libby, 2016 UT 41, ,I,I 10, 19.
See argument section A. above.
17
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~

hidden ground for reversal on appeal" (Aplee. Br. at 17, quoting Pratt v. Nelson, 2007
UT 41,

~

17), this argument is without support. Nazar' s unsupported invited error

argument is thus completely without merit.
C.

Because her argument ignores the well-settled law cited by Federated,
N azar's assertion that Federated is asking this Court to "upset over
100 years of precedent" is without merit.

Nazar argues that Federated is asking this Court to overrule the "place of
performance" test in breach of contract cases and "over 100 years of precedent." Aplee.
Br. at 33-42. Nazar's position seems to be that the place of performance rule always
applies in any breach of contract case. Id. Ironically, that position is contrary to statute
and case law and only serves to highlight the introductory language in the well-settled
law Nazar's argument ignores.

1. The introductory phrase of Section 188 of the Restatement of Conflicts
(Second) says: "In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties." The

section goes on to say that, in the absence of such an agreement, the "most significant
relationship" test applies. American National Fire Insurance v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 927 P.2d 186, 188, 190 (Utah 1996), quoting with approval Restatement of

Conflicts (Second) ("Restatement of Conflicts") § 188 (quoted in Federated's Opening
Brief at 9). While the Restatement lists several "contacts to be taken into account ... to
determine the law applicable to an issue," Utah case law has generally identified the
"place of performance" as "the most significant relationship." Id.; Pingree, 880 P.2d at
17 (see quotation and argument in the next subsection).
No one disputes that there was "an effective choice of law by the parties" here.
18
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~

Thus, pursuant to the Restatement of Conflicts, neither the "most significant
~

relationship" nor "place of performance" test applies. Nazar ignores the introductory
phrase in the Restatement because, by her reasoning, the "place of performance" test
should apparently always apply in a breach of contract case. This ignores the plain
language of the Restatement of Conflicts, which has been adopted in Utah. American
National, 827 P.2d at 188, 190, and is contrary to this Court's opinion in Pingree.

2. The introductory phrase in this Court's opinion in Pingree says: "Unless
the contract states otherwise ...." This phrase appears to echo Section 188 of the
Restatement of Conflicts quoted above. Since they both relate to the "most significant
relationship" or "place of performance" test, "Unless the contract says otherwise" in
Pingree appears to mean "[i]n the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties."

This Court went on to say in Pingree that absent such a contractual provision, "a
cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be
~

performed." Pingree, 880 P.2d at 17 (emphasis added). It seems notable that Pingree uses
the word "generally" regarding application of the "place of performance" test. In other

(.j

words, even where there is no effective choice of law by the parties, the "place of
performance" test does not always apply. But because there was an effective choice of
law by the parties here, the Court need go no further in its analysis.

~

In other words, where, as here, the contract does say otherwise (i.e., where there is
an effective choice of law by the parties), a breach of contract claim "arises" under the
substantive law of the state the parties have chosen to govern their case. This simple
principle, essentially ignored by Nazar in her opposition, that "[a] suit arises under the
19
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law that creates the cause of action," 8 is dispositive here. In this case, based on the
parties' express choice that Utah law govern their dispute, this breach of contract claim
arose in Utah. Thus, the Borrowing Statute does not apply.

Pingree also dealt with a contractual choice of place of performance. Aplee Br. at
43-45. But because a case "arises" under the law of the parties' choice, there is no need
for a trial court to reach or analyze either common law or contractual "place of
performance." Based on section 188 of the Restatement and Pingree, the parties' choice
of law is determinative as to where their case "arose."
Thus, Federated is not asking this court to overrule "100 years of precedent."

3. The introductory phrase in the Borrowing Statute says it applies to: "(a]
cause of action which arises in another juridiction .... " Utah Code § 78B-2- l 03
(emphasis added). In other words, the Borrowing Statute does not apply to a cause of
action which arises in Utah.
Thus, taking together the three introductory phrases in the settled law quoted
above (and which Nazar's argument ignores): because of the parties' express contractual
choice of law, Federated's breach of contract cause of action "arose" in Utah, so the
Borrowing Statute does not apply here and Utah's six-year statute of limitations does.
Accordingly, far from "overruling 100 years of precedent," settled law supports
Federated's arguments here and Nazar's contrary argument is unsupported.
8

Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed.
987 ( 1916) (Holmes, J. ). The only time Nazar addresses this principle in her opposition is
to note that it was applied in a patent case in a dispute about whether federal question or
state law applied. But she provides no support for her argument that it should not be
applied here. Aplee. Br. at 46-48.
20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

D.

Libby is not applicable to this case and Nazar misapprehends the rule
in Pingree.

Nazar argues that the Utah Supreme Court "was not 'clearly convinced' that the
subject rule [in Pingree] should be overturned and presented no compelling reason for
doing so." Aplee. Br. at 36-37. As shown above, Federated is not asking to overturn
Pingree. Nothing in Federated's arguments here requires overturning Pingree. Indeed,

applying the conditional phrase Nazar apparently ignores in Pingree is the very reason
Federated should prevail in this appeal.
Nazar further argues that neither the majority nor the concurring opinion in Libby
"discuss[ed] the issue" Federated has raised in this appeal. Id. at 37. This argument
misses the point because Federated conceded in Libby that its claim in that case arose in
~

Pennsylvania, not Utah. Thus, nothing in Federated's arguments here requires

overturning Libby because the Utah supreme court never considered the issue and
arguments Federated makes here.
Finally, Nazar's argument about Justice Lee's "speculation" in Libby (Id. at 24-26)
has no bearing on the issues here. This Court need only follow Section 188 in the
Restatement of Conflicts, Pingree, and the Borrowing Statute to conclude that, based on
the parties' effective choice of law, this case arose in Utah, so the Borrowing Statute does
not apply and Utah's six-year statute of limitations does.
E.

Federated's position follows the rule in Pingree.

Nazar asserts that Federated "completely misstates the holding in Pingree." Aplee.
Br. at 43. On the contrary, Federated quoted verbatim the entire holding in Pingree in its
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opening brief, namely, "Unless the contract states otherwise, a cause of action for a
breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be performed." Federated's
Opening Brief at 19, quoting Pingree, 880 P.2d at 17.
Ironically, Nazar's characterization of this holding is consistent with Federated's
position. Nazar says Pingree stands for the proposition that "unless the contract chooses a
jurisdiction other than where it is to be performed as the place where the cause of action
arises, the cause of action will arise where it is to be performed." Aplee. Br. at 44.
That is precisely Federated's position here: that the parties' choice of law in their
contract "chooses a jurisdiction other than where it is to be performed as the place where
the cause of action arises." Id. Nazar's characterization is thus consistent with
Federated's reading of Pingree and with Section 188 of the Restatement, namely: that the
parties' choice of law preempts place of performance. Nazar's characterization is also
consistent with the principle that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action."
In sum, contrary to Nazar's arguments (Aplee. Br. at 44-48), Federated's position
follows the holding in Pingree and other well-settled authorities.

F.

Nazar's policy arguments are misplaced because they ignore the settled
law supporting Federated's position.

In propounding her policy arguments (Aplee. Br. at 37-40), Nazar continues to
ignore the settled law cited above and in Federated's Opening Brief. But the settled law is
dispositive, policy considerations are secondary, and, according to the Restatement, those
policy factors apply primarily when the most significant relationship (or in Utah, the
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place of performance test) is at issue. See American National Fire Insurance, 927 P.2d at
189, and Restatement of Conflicts (Second), § 6.
Since the place of performance test is not at issue here, such policy considerations
merely support why the rule is settled law, namely "the protection of justified
expectations," "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law," "certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result," and "ease in the determination and application of
~

the law to be applied." Id.

1. Freedom to contract. Nazar gives lip service to parties' freedom to contract.
Aplee. Br. at 20-22. But her arguments seem to minimize the consequences of her failure
to repay the amounts advanced to her, and the impact of her choice of law. Contrary to
her assertions, place of performance does not preempt her choice of law. As shown
above, her choice of law preempts place of performance.
2. Judicial economy. Nazar seems to underestimate the judicial chore of
determining the place of performance in a digital world. Is it where she initiated an
electronic payment in Texas? Or where her bank (which may have been in another state)
actually disbursed the funds? Or where the funds were ultimately received by Advanta
bank?
In connection with an express choice of law by the parties, the simple rule that "[a]
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action" eliminates any further analysis.

It honors the parties' choice.

vi)

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

3. Simplicity. Nazar's repeated emphasis on the distinction between choice of law

(substantive law) and choice of forum (procedural law, including statutes of limitation) is
misplaced. Aplee. Br. at 38-44, 46-48. Federated understands and accepts the distinction.
Federated's argument is not that procedural law of the chosen forum should not
apply, it is that the choice of law provides the answer to the threshold question about
where a case "arises." Answering that question is dispositive about whether the
Borrowing Statute applies. For example, if the choice of law is Utah, Utah substantive
law governs the dispute, and therefore the cases "arises" under Utah law. Thus, because
the "cause of action [did not arise] in another jurisdiction," the Borrowing Statute does

CiJiv

not apply. Since the parties here also chose Utah as the forum, Utah's statute of
limitations for breach of a written contract (six years) applies.
In sum, Justice Holme's expression of the rule that "[a] suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action" is supported by the settled law in the Restatement,
Pingree, and the Borrowing Statute. Policies favoring parties' freedom to contract,
judicial economy, and simplicity support the rule that the parties' choice of law governs
where a breach of their agreement arises.

~

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in the opening brief, Federated
respectfully requests reversal of summary judgment and award of its fees below.
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